After the barons had lost the military service of their vassals, militias of some kind or other were established in most parts of Europe. But the prince having in all places the power of naming and preferring the officers of these militias, they could be no balance in government as the former were. And he that will think about what has been said in this discourse, will basically perceive that the essential quality requisite to such a militia, as might fully reply to the ends of the former, must be, that the officers ought to be named and preferred, as well as they and the soldiers paid, by the people that set them out. So that if princes look on the present militias as unable to defending a nation against foreign armies, the people have tiny reason to entrust them with the defence of their liberties.
Let us now think about whether they may not be able to defend ourselves by well- regulated militias against any foreign force, though never so formidable: that these nations may be free from the fears of invasion from abroad, as well as from the danger of slavery at home.
And though on the dissolution of that ancient militia under the barons, which made these nations so great and glorious, by setting up militias usually through Europe, the sword came not in to the hands of the Commons, which was the only thing could have continued the former balance of government, but was in all places put in to the hands of the king: nevertheless ambitious princes, who aimed at absolute power, thinking they could never use it effectually to that finish, unless it were wielded by mercenaries, and men that had no other interest in the commonwealth than their pay, have still endeavoured by all means to discredit militias, and render them burdensome to the people, by never suffering them to be on any right, or a lot as tolerable foot, and all to persuade the necessity of standing forces. And indeed they have succeeded well in this design: for the greatest part of the world has been fooled in to an opinion that a militia cannot be made serviceable. I shall not say it was only militias could conquer the world; and that princes to have succeeded fully in the design before-mentioned must have destroyed all the history and memory of ancient governments, where the accounts of so plenty of excellent models of militia are yet extant. I do know the prejudice and ignorance of the world concerning the art of war, as it was practised by the ancients; though what remains of that knowledge in their writings be sufficient to give a mean opinion of the modem discipline. For this reason I shall examine, by what has passed of late years in these nations, whether experience have satisfied us, that officers bred in foreign wars, be so far preferable to others who have been under no other discipline than that of an ordinary and ill-regulated militia; and if the commonalty of both kingdoms, at their first entrance on service, be not as able to a resolute military action, as any standing forces. This doubt will be fully resolved, by thinking about the actions of the marquis of Montrose, which may be compared, all circumstances thought about, with those of Caesar, as well for the military skill, as the bad tendency of them; though the marquis had never served abroad, nor seen any action, before the two victories, which, with numbers much inferior to those of his enemies, he obtained in year; and the most considerable of them were chiefly gained by the help of the tenants and vassals of the relatives of Gordon. The battle of Naseby will be a farther illustration of this matter, which is usually thought to have been the deciding action of the late civil war. The number of forces was equal on both sides; nor was there any advantage in the ground, or weird accident that happened in the work of the fight, which could be of considerable importance to either. In the army of the parliament, nine only of the officers had served abroad, and most of the soldiers were apprentices drawn out of London but months before. In the king's army there were above a thousand officers that had served in foreign parts: yet was that army routed and broken by those new-raised apprentices; who were observed to be obedient to command, and brave in fight; not only in that action, but on all occasions in the work of that active campaign. The people of these nations are not a dastardly crew, like those born in misery under oppression and slavery, who must have time to rub off that fear, cowardice, and stupidity which they bring from home. And though officers appear to stand in more need of experience than private soldiers; yet in that battle it was seen that the sobriety and principle of the officers on the side, prevailed over the experience of those on the other.
It is widely known that divers regiments of our army, lately in Flanders, have never been one time in action, and not half of them above thrice, nor any of them times in the work of the whole war. Oh, but they have been under discipline, and accustomed to obey! And so may men in militias. They have had to do with an enemy, who, though abounding in numbers of excellent officers, yet durst never fight us without a visible advantage. Is that enemy like to invade us, when he must be unavoidably necessitated to put all to hazard in0 days, or starve?
A lovely militia is of such importance to a nation, that it is the chief part of the constitution of any free government. For though as to other things, the constitution be never so slight, a lovely militia will always preserve the public liberty. But in the best constitution that ever was, as to all other parts of government, if the militia be not on a right foot, the liberty of that people must perish. The militia of ancient Rome, the best that ever was in any government, made her mistress of the world: but standing armies enslaved that great people, and their excellent militia and freedom perished together. The Lacedemonians continued three hundred years free, and in great honour, because they had a lovely militia. The Swisses at this day are the freest, happiest, and the people of all Europe who can best defend themselves, because they have the best militia.
That the whole free people of any nation ought to be exercised to arms, not only the example of our ancestors, as appears by the acts of parliament made in both kingdoms to that purpose, and that of the wisest governments among the ancients; but the advantage of choosing out of great numbers, seems clearly to demonstrate. For in countries where husbandry, trade, manufactures, and other mechanical arts are carried on, even in time of war, the impediments of men are so plenty of and so various, that unless the whole people be exercised, no considerable numbers of men can be drawn out, without disturbing those employments, which are the vitals of the political body. Besides, that on great defeats, and under extreme calamities, from which no government was ever exempted, every nation stands in need of all the people, as the ancients sometimes did of their slaves. And I cannot see why arms ought to be denied to any man who is not a slave, since they are the only true badges of liberty; and ought never, but in times of utmost necessity, to be put in to the hands of mercenaries or slaves: neither am I able to understand why any man that has arms ought to not be taught the use of them.
I have shown that liberty in the monarchical governments of Europe, subsisted as long as the militia of the barons was on foot: and that on the decay of their militia (which though it was not of the best, so was it not of the worst) standing forces and tyranny have been in all places introduced, unless in Britain and Ireland; which by
Kamis, 27 Januari 2011
Rabu, 26 Januari 2011
relation of government and militia part 4
I am not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often given by diets, states, & parliaments, & some raised by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these were small, & no way sufficient to subsist such numerous armies as those of the barons' militia. There were likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes who aimed at arbitrary power, & by some commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but these were only strangers, or in small numbers, & held no proportion with those huge armies of mercenaries which this change has fixed on Europe to her affliction & ruin.
Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of France & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of France they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of France would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for require of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain seven hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of France already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or seven hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of France speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of France had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having two times procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.
Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of France, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Italian counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) they was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.
What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great manipulation lost all her conquests in France, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Italian before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards France, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.
Henry the seventh, King of England, seems to have perceived sooner, & understood better the manipulation before-mentioned, than any prince of his time, & obtained several laws to favour & facilitate it. But his successors were altogether improper to second him: for Henry the eighth was an unthinking prince. The reigns of Edward the sixth & Queen Mary were short; & Queen Elizabeth loved her people well to attempt it. King James, who succeeded her, was a stranger in England, & of no interest abroad. King Charles the first did indeed endeavour to make himself absolute, though preposterously; for they tried to seize the purse, before they was master of the sword. But wise men have been of opinion, that if they had been possessed of as numerous guards as those which were afterwards raised, & constantly kept up by King Charles the second, they might basically have succeeded in his enterprise. For they see that in those struggles which the country party had with King Charles the second, & in those endeavours they used to bring about that revolution which was afterwards compassed by a foreign power, the chief & insuperable difficulty they met with, was from those guards. & though King James the second had provoked these nations to the last degree, & made his own game as hard as feasible, not only by invading our civil liberties, but likewise by endeavouring to change the established religion for another which the people abhorred, whereby they lost their affections, & even those of a great part of his army: yet notwithstanding all this mismanagement, Britain stood in require of a foreign force to save it; & how dangerous a treatment that is, the histories of all ages can witness. It is true, this circumstance was favourable, that a prince who had married the next heir to these kingdoms, was at the head of our deliverance: yet did it engage us in a long & costly war. & now that they are much impoverished, & England by means of her former riches & present poverty, fallen in to all the corruptions which those great enemies of virtue, require, & excess of riches can produce; that there's such numbers of mercenary forces on foot at home & abroad; that the greatest part of the officers have no other way to subsist; that they are commanded by a wise & active King, who has at his disposal the formidable land & sea forces of a neighbouring nation, the great rival of our trade; a King, who by blood, relation, other particular ties, & common interest, has the house of Austria, most of the princes of Germany, & potentates of the North, for his friends & allies; who can, whatever interest they join with, do what they thinks slot in Europe; I say, if a mercenary standing army be kept up (the first of that kind, except those of the usurper Cromwell, & the late King James, that Britain has seen for thirteen hundred years) I desire to know where the security of the British liberties lies, unless in the nice will & pleasure of the King: I desire to know, what actual security can be had against standing armies of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of both nations, the tendency of the lifestyle, the genius of the age, & the example of the world
By these powerful reasons being made sensible of her error, the Queen desisted from her demands. Her daughter Queen Mary, who, as the great historian says, looked on the moderate government of a limited kingdom, to be disgraceful to monarchs, & on the slavery of the people, as the freedom of kings, resolved to have guards about her person; but could not fall on a way to compass them: for they could find no pretext, unless it were the empty show of magnificence which belongs to a court, & the example of foreign princes; for the former kings had always trusted themselves to the faith of the barons. At length on a false & ridiculous pretence, of an purpose in a definite nobleman to seize her person, they assumed them; but they were soon abolished. Nor had her son King James any other guards whilst they was King of Scotland only, than forty gentlemen: & that King declares in the act of parliament, by which they are established, that they won't burden his people by any tax or imposition for their maintenance.
Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of France & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of France they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of France would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for require of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain seven hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of France already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or seven hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of France speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of France had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having two times procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.
Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of France, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Italian counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) they was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.
What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great manipulation lost all her conquests in France, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Italian before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards France, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.
Henry the seventh, King of England, seems to have perceived sooner, & understood better the manipulation before-mentioned, than any prince of his time, & obtained several laws to favour & facilitate it. But his successors were altogether improper to second him: for Henry the eighth was an unthinking prince. The reigns of Edward the sixth & Queen Mary were short; & Queen Elizabeth loved her people well to attempt it. King James, who succeeded her, was a stranger in England, & of no interest abroad. King Charles the first did indeed endeavour to make himself absolute, though preposterously; for they tried to seize the purse, before they was master of the sword. But wise men have been of opinion, that if they had been possessed of as numerous guards as those which were afterwards raised, & constantly kept up by King Charles the second, they might basically have succeeded in his enterprise. For they see that in those struggles which the country party had with King Charles the second, & in those endeavours they used to bring about that revolution which was afterwards compassed by a foreign power, the chief & insuperable difficulty they met with, was from those guards. & though King James the second had provoked these nations to the last degree, & made his own game as hard as feasible, not only by invading our civil liberties, but likewise by endeavouring to change the established religion for another which the people abhorred, whereby they lost their affections, & even those of a great part of his army: yet notwithstanding all this mismanagement, Britain stood in require of a foreign force to save it; & how dangerous a treatment that is, the histories of all ages can witness. It is true, this circumstance was favourable, that a prince who had married the next heir to these kingdoms, was at the head of our deliverance: yet did it engage us in a long & costly war. & now that they are much impoverished, & England by means of her former riches & present poverty, fallen in to all the corruptions which those great enemies of virtue, require, & excess of riches can produce; that there's such numbers of mercenary forces on foot at home & abroad; that the greatest part of the officers have no other way to subsist; that they are commanded by a wise & active King, who has at his disposal the formidable land & sea forces of a neighbouring nation, the great rival of our trade; a King, who by blood, relation, other particular ties, & common interest, has the house of Austria, most of the princes of Germany, & potentates of the North, for his friends & allies; who can, whatever interest they join with, do what they thinks slot in Europe; I say, if a mercenary standing army be kept up (the first of that kind, except those of the usurper Cromwell, & the late King James, that Britain has seen for thirteen hundred years) I desire to know where the security of the British liberties lies, unless in the nice will & pleasure of the King: I desire to know, what actual security can be had against standing armies of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of both nations, the tendency of the lifestyle, the genius of the age, & the example of the world
By these powerful reasons being made sensible of her error, the Queen desisted from her demands. Her daughter Queen Mary, who, as the great historian says, looked on the moderate government of a limited kingdom, to be disgraceful to monarchs, & on the slavery of the people, as the freedom of kings, resolved to have guards about her person; but could not fall on a way to compass them: for they could find no pretext, unless it were the empty show of magnificence which belongs to a court, & the example of foreign princes; for the former kings had always trusted themselves to the faith of the barons. At length on a false & ridiculous pretence, of an purpose in a definite nobleman to seize her person, they assumed them; but they were soon abolished. Nor had her son King James any other guards whilst they was King of Scotland only, than forty gentlemen: & that King declares in the act of parliament, by which they are established, that they won't burden his people by any tax or imposition for their maintenance.
Selasa, 25 Januari 2011
relation of government and militia part 3
Now if any man in compassion to the miseries of a people ought to endeavour to disabuse them in anything relating to government, they will certainly incur the displeasure, & possibly be pursued by the anger of those, who think they find their account in the oppression of the world; but will not very succeed in his endeavours to undeceive the multitude. For the generality of all ranks of men are cheated by words & names; & provided the ancient terms & outward forms of any government be retained, let the nature of it be seldom a lot altered, they continue to dream that they shall still enjoy their former liberty, an are not to be awakened till it show late. Of this there's plenty of exceptional examples in history; but that particular instance which I have selected to insist on, as most suitable to my purpose, is the modification of government which happened in most countries of Europe about the year 1500. & it is worth observation, that though this modify was deadly to their liberty, yet it was not introduced by the contrivance of ill-designing men; nor were the mischievous consequences perceived, unless perhaps by a few wise men, who, in the event that they saw it, wanted power to prevent it.
hundred years being already passed since this modification began, Europe has felt the effects of it by mournful experience; & the true causes of the modify are now become more visible.
To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, & examine the original & constitution of those governments that were established in Europe about the year 400, & continued till this modification.
There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity & cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, & luxury, set themselves with the utmost art & violence to procure their establishment: & by such men very the whole world has been trampled underfoot, & subjected to tyranny, for need of understanding by what means & methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care & pains to instruct themselves in other arts & sciences, yet only a few apply themselves to think about the nature of government, an enquiry so useful & necessary both to magistrate & people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become very in all places a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a small part of the time & application which they throw away on curious but useless studies, or countless gambling, in scanning those excellent rules & examples of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses & corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore very unusual that they ought to think study & knowledge necessary in everything they go about, except in the noblest & most useful of all applications, the art of government.
When the Goths, Vandals, & other warlike nations had, at different times, & under different leaders, overrun the western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following type of government in to all the nations they subdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; & the conquest being absolute, they divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their several territories in smaller portions to the inferior soldiers that had followed them in the wars, & who then became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for the maintenance of his court & attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot, but every man went to live on his own lands; & when the defence of the country necessary an army, the king summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe composed for about eleven hundred years; & this constitution of government put the sword in to the hands of the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not make use of their power to damage those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely on for his support in such an attempt.
I lay no great stress on any other limitations of those monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in the hands of the subject. & since in our time most princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refusing funds, though vested in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty, where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for they that is armed is always master of the purse of him that is unarmed. & not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince.
I do not deny that these limited monarchies, in the work of the greatness of the barons, had some defects: I do know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those governments steady, & an effectual provision against the encroachments of the crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My design in the first place is to describe the nature of the past & present governments of Europe, & to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same names; & who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that liberty which is yet left.
In order to this, & for an additional & clearer illustration of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the causes, occasions, & the complication of those plenty of unexpected accidents; which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a modify. & it will at first sight appear very unusual, when I shall name the restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle & of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in themselves so excellent, & which, the last only excepted, might have proved of boundless advantage to the world, if their remote influence on government had been obviated by suitable cures. Such odd consequences, & of such a different nature, accompany strange inventions of any kind.
Constantinople being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, plenty of learned Greeks fled over in to Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, & republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the better kind of men, the study of the Greek tongue, & of the ancient authors in that language. About the same time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, & the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, & their arts usually understood & admired. But as mankind from a natural propension to pleasure, is always prepared to select out of everything what may most gratify that vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve were mainly those that had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the most corrupt ages, of which they had plenty of monuments still remaining. Spain was presently filled with architects, painters, & sculptors; & a prodigious expense was made in buildings, pics, & statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal & military way of life, & addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined & pricey pleasures, as much as the wars of those times would permit. This infection spread itself by degrees in to the neighbouring nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a modify in government, if a earlier invention, brought in to common use about that time, had not produced more new & strange effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have plenty of consequences yet unexpected, & a farther influence on the manners of men, as long as the world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage opened by sea to the East Indies, & a brand spanking new world discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia & The united states was added to that of the ancients; & all ages, & all countries concurred, to sink Europe in to an abyss of pleasures; which were rendered the more pricey by a perpetual modify of the fashions in clothes, equipage, & furniture of houses.
These things brought a total modification in the lifestyle, on which all government depends. It is true, knowledge being mightily increased, & a great curiosity & nicety in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal & military way of life, which I must confess had some mixture of rudeness & ignorance in it, though not inseparable from it. But simultaneously they did not think about the unspeakable evils that are altogether inseparable from an pricey way of life.
To touch on all these, though slightly, would carryover me far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this discourse.
The far greater share of all those expenses fell on the barons; for they were the persons most able to make them, & their dignity appeared to challenge whatever might distinguish them from other men. This plunged them on a sudden in to so great debts, that in the event that they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their lands, they found themselves at least obliged to turn the military service their vassals owed them in to money; partly by way of rent, & partly by way of lease, or fine, for payment of their creditors. & by this means the vassal having his lands no longer at so simple a rate as before, could no more be obliged to military service, & so became a tenant. Thus the armies, which in earlier times had been always composed of such men as these, ceased of work, & the sword fell out of the hands of the barons. But there being always a necessity to provide for the defence of every country, princes were afterwards allowed to raise armies of volunteers & mercenaries. & great sums got by diets & parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied on the people grown rich by trade, & dispirited for need of military exercise. Such forces were at first only raised for present exigencies, & continued no longer on foot than the occasions lasted. But princes soon found pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the garrisoning frontier towns & fortresses; the methods of war being altered to the tedious & chargeable way of sieges, mainly by the invention of gunpowder. The officers & soldiers of these mercenary armies depending for their subsistence & promotion, as immediately on the prince, as the former militias did on the barons, the power of the sword was transferred from the subject to the king, & war grew a constant trade to live by. Nay, plenty of of the barons themselves being reduced to poverty by their pricey way of life, took commands in those mercenary troops; & being still continued hereditary members of diets, & other assemblies of state, after the loss of their vassals, whom they formerly represented, they were now the readiest of all others to load the people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increase the prince's military power, by guards, armies, & citadels, beyond bounds or treatment.
hundred years being already passed since this modification began, Europe has felt the effects of it by mournful experience; & the true causes of the modify are now become more visible.
To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, & examine the original & constitution of those governments that were established in Europe about the year 400, & continued till this modification.
There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity & cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, & luxury, set themselves with the utmost art & violence to procure their establishment: & by such men very the whole world has been trampled underfoot, & subjected to tyranny, for need of understanding by what means & methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care & pains to instruct themselves in other arts & sciences, yet only a few apply themselves to think about the nature of government, an enquiry so useful & necessary both to magistrate & people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become very in all places a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a small part of the time & application which they throw away on curious but useless studies, or countless gambling, in scanning those excellent rules & examples of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses & corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore very unusual that they ought to think study & knowledge necessary in everything they go about, except in the noblest & most useful of all applications, the art of government.
When the Goths, Vandals, & other warlike nations had, at different times, & under different leaders, overrun the western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following type of government in to all the nations they subdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; & the conquest being absolute, they divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their several territories in smaller portions to the inferior soldiers that had followed them in the wars, & who then became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for the maintenance of his court & attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot, but every man went to live on his own lands; & when the defence of the country necessary an army, the king summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe composed for about eleven hundred years; & this constitution of government put the sword in to the hands of the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not make use of their power to damage those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely on for his support in such an attempt.
I lay no great stress on any other limitations of those monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in the hands of the subject. & since in our time most princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refusing funds, though vested in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty, where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for they that is armed is always master of the purse of him that is unarmed. & not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince.
I do not deny that these limited monarchies, in the work of the greatness of the barons, had some defects: I do know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those governments steady, & an effectual provision against the encroachments of the crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My design in the first place is to describe the nature of the past & present governments of Europe, & to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same names; & who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that liberty which is yet left.
In order to this, & for an additional & clearer illustration of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the causes, occasions, & the complication of those plenty of unexpected accidents; which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a modify. & it will at first sight appear very unusual, when I shall name the restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle & of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in themselves so excellent, & which, the last only excepted, might have proved of boundless advantage to the world, if their remote influence on government had been obviated by suitable cures. Such odd consequences, & of such a different nature, accompany strange inventions of any kind.
Constantinople being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, plenty of learned Greeks fled over in to Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, & republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the better kind of men, the study of the Greek tongue, & of the ancient authors in that language. About the same time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, & the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, & their arts usually understood & admired. But as mankind from a natural propension to pleasure, is always prepared to select out of everything what may most gratify that vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve were mainly those that had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the most corrupt ages, of which they had plenty of monuments still remaining. Spain was presently filled with architects, painters, & sculptors; & a prodigious expense was made in buildings, pics, & statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal & military way of life, & addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined & pricey pleasures, as much as the wars of those times would permit. This infection spread itself by degrees in to the neighbouring nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a modify in government, if a earlier invention, brought in to common use about that time, had not produced more new & strange effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have plenty of consequences yet unexpected, & a farther influence on the manners of men, as long as the world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage opened by sea to the East Indies, & a brand spanking new world discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia & The united states was added to that of the ancients; & all ages, & all countries concurred, to sink Europe in to an abyss of pleasures; which were rendered the more pricey by a perpetual modify of the fashions in clothes, equipage, & furniture of houses.
These things brought a total modification in the lifestyle, on which all government depends. It is true, knowledge being mightily increased, & a great curiosity & nicety in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal & military way of life, which I must confess had some mixture of rudeness & ignorance in it, though not inseparable from it. But simultaneously they did not think about the unspeakable evils that are altogether inseparable from an pricey way of life.
To touch on all these, though slightly, would carryover me far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this discourse.
The far greater share of all those expenses fell on the barons; for they were the persons most able to make them, & their dignity appeared to challenge whatever might distinguish them from other men. This plunged them on a sudden in to so great debts, that in the event that they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their lands, they found themselves at least obliged to turn the military service their vassals owed them in to money; partly by way of rent, & partly by way of lease, or fine, for payment of their creditors. & by this means the vassal having his lands no longer at so simple a rate as before, could no more be obliged to military service, & so became a tenant. Thus the armies, which in earlier times had been always composed of such men as these, ceased of work, & the sword fell out of the hands of the barons. But there being always a necessity to provide for the defence of every country, princes were afterwards allowed to raise armies of volunteers & mercenaries. & great sums got by diets & parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied on the people grown rich by trade, & dispirited for need of military exercise. Such forces were at first only raised for present exigencies, & continued no longer on foot than the occasions lasted. But princes soon found pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the garrisoning frontier towns & fortresses; the methods of war being altered to the tedious & chargeable way of sieges, mainly by the invention of gunpowder. The officers & soldiers of these mercenary armies depending for their subsistence & promotion, as immediately on the prince, as the former militias did on the barons, the power of the sword was transferred from the subject to the king, & war grew a constant trade to live by. Nay, plenty of of the barons themselves being reduced to poverty by their pricey way of life, took commands in those mercenary troops; & being still continued hereditary members of diets, & other assemblies of state, after the loss of their vassals, whom they formerly represented, they were now the readiest of all others to load the people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increase the prince's military power, by guards, armies, & citadels, beyond bounds or treatment.
Senin, 24 Januari 2011
relation of government and militia part 2
The far greater share of all those expenses fell on the barons; for they were the persons most able to make them, & their dignity appeared to challenge whatever might distinguish them from other men. This plunged them on a sudden in to so great debts, that in the event that they did not sell, or otherwise alienate their lands, they found themselves at least obliged to turn the military service their vassals owed them in to money; partly by way of rent, & partly by way of lease, or fine, for payment of their creditors. & by this means the vassal having his lands no longer at so simple a rate as before, could no more be obliged to military service, & so became a tenant. Thus the armies, which in earlier times had been always composed of such men as these, ceased of work, & the sword fell out of the hands of the barons. But there being always a necessity to provide for the defence of every country, princes were afterwards allowed to raise armies of volunteers & mercenaries. & great sums got by diets & parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied on the people grown rich by trade, & dispirited for need of military exercise. Such forces were at first only raised for present exigencies, & continued no longer on foot than the occasions lasted. But princes soon found pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the garrisoning frontier towns & fortresses; the methods of war being altered to the tedious & chargeable way of sieges, mainly by the invention of gunpowder. The officers & soldiers of these mercenary armies depending for their subsistence & promotion, as immediately on the prince, as the former militias did on the barons, the power of the sword was transferred from the subject to the king, & war grew a constant trade to live by. Nay, plenty of of the barons themselves being reduced to poverty by their expensive way of life, took commands in those mercenary troops; & being still continued hereditary members of diets, & other assemblies of state, after the loss of their vassals, whom they formerly represented, they were now the readiest of all others to load the people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increase the prince's military power, by guards, armies, & citadels, beyond bounds or treatment.
These things brought a total modification in the lifestyle, on which all government depends. It is true, knowledge being mightily increased, & a great curiosity & nicety in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal & military way of life, which I must confess had some mixture of rudeness & ignorance in it, though not inseparable from it. But simultaneously they did not think about the unspeakable evils that are altogether inseparable from an expensive way of life.
To touch on all these, though slightly, would carryover me far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this discourse.
Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of Germany & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of Germany they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of Germany would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for need of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain six hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of Germany already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or six hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of Germany speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of Germany had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having one time procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.
I am not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often given by diets, states, & parliaments, & some raised by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these were small, & no way sufficient to subsist such numerous armies as those of the barons' militia. There were likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes who aimed at arbitrary power, & by some commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but these were only strangers, or in small numbers, & held no proportion with those massive armies of mercenaries which this change has fixed on Europe to her affliction & ruin.
What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great modification lost all her conquests in Germany, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Spanish before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards Germany, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.
Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of Germany, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Spanish counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) he was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.
These things brought a total modification in the lifestyle, on which all government depends. It is true, knowledge being mightily increased, & a great curiosity & nicety in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal & military way of life, which I must confess had some mixture of rudeness & ignorance in it, though not inseparable from it. But simultaneously they did not think about the unspeakable evils that are altogether inseparable from an expensive way of life.
To touch on all these, though slightly, would carryover me far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this discourse.
Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of Germany & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of Germany they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of Germany would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for need of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain six hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of Germany already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or six hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of Germany speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of Germany had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having one time procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.
I am not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often given by diets, states, & parliaments, & some raised by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these were small, & no way sufficient to subsist such numerous armies as those of the barons' militia. There were likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes who aimed at arbitrary power, & by some commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but these were only strangers, or in small numbers, & held no proportion with those massive armies of mercenaries which this change has fixed on Europe to her affliction & ruin.
What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great modification lost all her conquests in Germany, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Spanish before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards Germany, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.
Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of Germany, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Spanish counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) he was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.
Sabtu, 22 Januari 2011
relation of government and militia part 1
Now if any man in compassion to the miseries of a people ought to endeavour to disabuse them in anything relating to government, they will certainly incur the displeasure, & perhaps be pursued by the anger of those, who think they find their account in the oppression of the world; but will not very succeed in his endeavours to undeceive the multitude. For the generality of all ranks of men are cheated by words & names; & provided the ancient terms & outward forms of any government be retained, let the nature of it be never a lot altered, they continue to dream that they shall still enjoy their former liberty, an are not to be awakened till it show late. Of this there's plenty of exceptional examples in history; but that particular instance which I have selected to insist on, as most suitable to my purpose, is the modification of government which happened in most countries of Europe about the year 1500. & it is worth observation, that though this change was deadly to their liberty, yet it was not introduced by the contrivance of ill-designing men; nor were the mischievous consequences perceived, unless perhaps by a few wise men, who, in the event that they saw it, wanted power to prevent it.
hundred years being already passed since this modification began, Europe has felt the effects of it by mournful experience; & the true causes of the change are now become more visible.
To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, & examine the original & constitution of those governments that were established in Europe about the year 400, & continued till this modification.
There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity & cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, & luxury, set themselves with the utmost art & violence to procure their establishment: & by such men the whole world has been trampled underfoot, & subjected to tyranny, for need of understanding by what means & methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care & pains to instruct themselves in other arts & sciences, yet only a few apply themselves to think about the nature of government, an enquiry so useful & necessary both to magistrate & people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become in all places a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a tiny part of the time & application which they throw away on curious but useless studies, or limitless gambling, in scanning those excellent rules & examples of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses & corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore unusual that they ought to think study & knowledge necessary in everything they go about, except in the noblest & most useful of all applications, the art of government.
When the Goths, Vandals, & other warlike nations had, at different times, & under different leaders, overrun the western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following kind of government in to all the nations they subdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; & the conquest being absolute, they divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their several territories in smaller portions to the inferior soldiers that had followed them in the wars, & who then became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for the maintenance of his court & attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot, but every man went to live on his own lands; & when the defence of the country necessary an army, the king summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe composed for about eleven hundred years; & this constitution of government put the sword in to the hands of the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not make use of their power to damage those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely on for his support in such an attempt.
I lay no great stress on any other limitations of those monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in the hands of the subject. & since in our time most princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refusing funds, though vested in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty, where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for they that is armed is always master of the purse of him that is unarmed. & not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince.
I do not deny that these limited monarchies, in the coursework of the greatness of the barons, had some defects: I do know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those governments steady, & an effectual provision against the encroachments of the crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My design in the first place is to report the nature of the past & present governments of Europe, & to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same names; & who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that liberty which is yet left.
In order to this, & for an additional & clearer illustration of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the causes, occasions, & the complication of those plenty of unexpected accidents; which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a change. & it will at first sight appear unusual, when I shall name the restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle & of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in themselves so excellent, & which, the last only excepted, might have proved of boundless advantage to the world, if their remote influence on government had been obviated by suitable cures. Such odd consequences, & of such a different nature, accompany weird inventions of any kind.
Constantinople being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, plenty of learned Greeks fled over in to Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, & republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the better kind of men, the study of the Greek tongue, & of the ancient authors in that language. About the same time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, & the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, & their arts usually understood & admired. But as mankind from a natural propension to pleasure, is always prepared to pick out of everything what may most gratify that vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve were mainly those that had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the most corrupt ages, of which they had plenty of monuments still remaining. Spain was presently filled with architects, painters, & sculptors; as well as a prodigious expense was made in buildings, pics, & statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal & military way of life, & addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined & expensive pleasures, as much as the wars of those times would permit. This infection spread itself by degrees in to the neighbouring nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a change in government, if a earlier invention, brought in to common use about that time, had not produced more new & weird effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have plenty of consequences yet unexpected, as well as a farther influence on the manners of men, as long as the world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage opened by sea to the East Indies, as well as a used world discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia & America was added to that of the ancients; & all ages, & all countries concurred, to sink Europe in to an abyss of pleasures; which were rendered the more expensive by a perpetual change of the fashions in clothes, equipage, & furniture of houses.
hundred years being already passed since this modification began, Europe has felt the effects of it by mournful experience; & the true causes of the change are now become more visible.
To lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be necessary to look farther back, & examine the original & constitution of those governments that were established in Europe about the year 400, & continued till this modification.
There is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable as the indignity & cruelty with which the far greater part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them, as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, & luxury, set themselves with the utmost art & violence to procure their establishment: & by such men the whole world has been trampled underfoot, & subjected to tyranny, for need of understanding by what means & methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great care & pains to instruct themselves in other arts & sciences, yet only a few apply themselves to think about the nature of government, an enquiry so useful & necessary both to magistrate & people. Nay, in most countries the arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become in all places a crime to reason about matters of government. But if men would bestow a tiny part of the time & application which they throw away on curious but useless studies, or limitless gambling, in scanning those excellent rules & examples of government which the ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to discover all such abuses & corruptions as tend to the ruin of public societies. It is therefore unusual that they ought to think study & knowledge necessary in everything they go about, except in the noblest & most useful of all applications, the art of government.
When the Goths, Vandals, & other warlike nations had, at different times, & under different leaders, overrun the western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the following kind of government in to all the nations they subdued. The general of the army became king of the conquered country; & the conquest being absolute, they divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army, afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their several territories in smaller portions to the inferior soldiers that had followed them in the wars, & who then became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for the maintenance of his court & attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot, but every man went to live on his own lands; & when the defence of the country necessary an army, the king summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe composed for about eleven hundred years; & this constitution of government put the sword in to the hands of the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not make use of their power to damage those limited monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor could the king invade their privileges, having no other forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely on for his support in such an attempt.
I lay no great stress on any other limitations of those monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in the hands of the subject. & since in our time most princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace, absolutely depending on them, I say that all such governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor can the power of granting or refusing funds, though vested in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty, where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace: for they that is armed is always master of the purse of him that is unarmed. & not only that government is tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all governments are tyrannical, which have not in their constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary power of the prince.
I do not deny that these limited monarchies, in the coursework of the greatness of the barons, had some defects: I do know few governments free from them. But after all, there was a balance that kept those governments steady, & an effectual provision against the encroachments of the crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My design in the first place is to report the nature of the past & present governments of Europe, & to disabuse those who think them the same, because they are called by the same names; & who ignorantly clamour against such as would preserve that liberty which is yet left.
In order to this, & for an additional & clearer illustration of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the causes, occasions, & the complication of those plenty of unexpected accidents; which falling out much about the same time, produced so great a change. & it will at first sight appear unusual, when I shall name the restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the needle & of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in themselves so excellent, & which, the last only excepted, might have proved of boundless advantage to the world, if their remote influence on government had been obviated by suitable cures. Such odd consequences, & of such a different nature, accompany weird inventions of any kind.
Constantinople being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, plenty of learned Greeks fled over in to Italy; where the favourable reception they found from the popes, princes, & republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the better kind of men, the study of the Greek tongue, & of the ancient authors in that language. About the same time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to the advancement of all kind of learning, & the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years after. By this means their books became common, & their arts usually understood & admired. But as mankind from a natural propension to pleasure, is always prepared to pick out of everything what may most gratify that vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first applied themselves to improve were mainly those that had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the most corrupt ages, of which they had plenty of monuments still remaining. Spain was presently filled with architects, painters, & sculptors; as well as a prodigious expense was made in buildings, pics, & statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal & military way of life, & addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined & expensive pleasures, as much as the wars of those times would permit. This infection spread itself by degrees in to the neighbouring nations. But these things alone had not been sufficient to work so great a change in government, if a earlier invention, brought in to common use about that time, had not produced more new & weird effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have plenty of consequences yet unexpected, as well as a farther influence on the manners of men, as long as the world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage opened by sea to the East Indies, as well as a used world discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia & America was added to that of the ancients; & all ages, & all countries concurred, to sink Europe in to an abyss of pleasures; which were rendered the more expensive by a perpetual change of the fashions in clothes, equipage, & furniture of houses.
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