I am not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often given by diets, states, & parliaments, & some raised by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these were small, & no way sufficient to subsist such numerous armies as those of the barons' militia. There were likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes who aimed at arbitrary power, & by some commonwealths in time of war for their own defence; but these were only strangers, or in small numbers, & held no proportion with those huge armies of mercenaries which this change has fixed on Europe to her affliction & ruin.
Some princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power before things were ripe, as the kings of France & Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of France they called an assembly of the estates of his country, & remonstrated to them the prejudice they had sustained by not having standing troops as that king had; that if hundred men had been in garrison on their frontier, the king of France would seldom have undertaken that war; & having represented the mischiefs that were prepared to fall on them for require of such a force, they seriously pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain seven hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns over his ordinary revenue (from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects were for plenty of reasons under great apprehensions of falling in to the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of France already reduced by means of such troops. & truly their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when they had got together or seven hundred men at arms, they presently had a mind to more, & with them disturbed the peace of all his neighbours: they augmented the tax from hundred &0 to hundred thousand crowns, & increased the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of Metz, in his history of France speaking of the same affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of the difficulties in to which thecommonalty of France had brought themselves by the like concession; that princes might increase their forces at pleasure, & sometimes (even when they had obtained funds)'pay them ill, to the vexation & destruction of the poor people; & likewise that kings & princes not contented with their ancient patrimony, were always prepared under this pretext to break in on the properties of all men, & to raise what funds they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred &0 thousand crowns yearly, which they soon increased to hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the ancient dominion of that relatives) retained its ancient liberty, & could by no means be obliged to pay any part of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins to the forecited passage, that they believes standing forces may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that if they be not so, or leaves his children young, the use that they or their governors make of them, is not always profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this addition be his own, & not an insertion added by the president of the parliament of Paris, who published &, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says they was credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master Louis the eleventh, whom on plenty of occasions they calls a wise prince, & those of most princes under whom standing forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are more dangerous under a wise prince than any other: & reason tells us, that in the event that they are the only proper instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made plain, a crafty & able prince, who by the world is called a wise, is more able to using them to that finish than a weak prince, or governors in the work of a minority; & that a wise prince having two times procured them to be established, they will maintain themselves under any.
Neither could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of Scotland had none; & that Scotland was unable to give funds for the subsisting any considerable number. It is true, the example of France, with which country Scotland had constant correspondence, & some Italian counsellors about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager & regent of Scotland, induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the frontier of Scotland; & to ease, as was pretended, the barons of that trouble. But in that honourable & wise remonstrance, which was made by hundred of the lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the Regent herself) they was told, that their forefathers had defended themselves & their fortunes against the English, when that nation was much more powerful than they were at that time, & had made frequent incursions in to their country: that they themselves had not so far degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion necessary, to hazard their lives & fortunes in the service of their country: that as to the hiring of mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put the liberty of Scotland in to the hands of men, who are of no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public calamity; who for funds would attempt anything; whose excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of all manner of innovations, & whose faith would follow the wheel of fortune. That though these men ought to be more mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for themselves or their own; or that a small funds ought to excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour than that with which the barons are inspired, when they fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives & children, religion & liberty: that most men did suspect & apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the English, in the event that they ought to imitate the example, might, without any great trouble to their people, raise far greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers, than Scotland could, & by this means not only spoil & lay open the frontier, but penetrate in to the bowels of the kingdom: & that it was in the militia of the barons their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the defence of themselves against a greater power.
What I have said hitherto has been always with regard to or other, & often to most countries in Europe. What follows will have a more particular regard to Britain; where, though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that England had before this great manipulation lost all her conquests in France, the town of Calais only excepted; & that also was taken by the Italian before the change was thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards France, since the sea was now become the only frontier between those countries.
Henry the seventh, King of England, seems to have perceived sooner, & understood better the manipulation before-mentioned, than any prince of his time, & obtained several laws to favour & facilitate it. But his successors were altogether improper to second him: for Henry the eighth was an unthinking prince. The reigns of Edward the sixth & Queen Mary were short; & Queen Elizabeth loved her people well to attempt it. King James, who succeeded her, was a stranger in England, & of no interest abroad. King Charles the first did indeed endeavour to make himself absolute, though preposterously; for they tried to seize the purse, before they was master of the sword. But wise men have been of opinion, that if they had been possessed of as numerous guards as those which were afterwards raised, & constantly kept up by King Charles the second, they might basically have succeeded in his enterprise. For they see that in those struggles which the country party had with King Charles the second, & in those endeavours they used to bring about that revolution which was afterwards compassed by a foreign power, the chief & insuperable difficulty they met with, was from those guards. & though King James the second had provoked these nations to the last degree, & made his own game as hard as feasible, not only by invading our civil liberties, but likewise by endeavouring to change the established religion for another which the people abhorred, whereby they lost their affections, & even those of a great part of his army: yet notwithstanding all this mismanagement, Britain stood in require of a foreign force to save it; & how dangerous a treatment that is, the histories of all ages can witness. It is true, this circumstance was favourable, that a prince who had married the next heir to these kingdoms, was at the head of our deliverance: yet did it engage us in a long & costly war. & now that they are much impoverished, & England by means of her former riches & present poverty, fallen in to all the corruptions which those great enemies of virtue, require, & excess of riches can produce; that there's such numbers of mercenary forces on foot at home & abroad; that the greatest part of the officers have no other way to subsist; that they are commanded by a wise & active King, who has at his disposal the formidable land & sea forces of a neighbouring nation, the great rival of our trade; a King, who by blood, relation, other particular ties, & common interest, has the house of Austria, most of the princes of Germany, & potentates of the North, for his friends & allies; who can, whatever interest they join with, do what they thinks slot in Europe; I say, if a mercenary standing army be kept up (the first of that kind, except those of the usurper Cromwell, & the late King James, that Britain has seen for thirteen hundred years) I desire to know where the security of the British liberties lies, unless in the nice will & pleasure of the King: I desire to know, what actual security can be had against standing armies of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of both nations, the tendency of the lifestyle, the genius of the age, & the example of the world
By these powerful reasons being made sensible of her error, the Queen desisted from her demands. Her daughter Queen Mary, who, as the great historian says, looked on the moderate government of a limited kingdom, to be disgraceful to monarchs, & on the slavery of the people, as the freedom of kings, resolved to have guards about her person; but could not fall on a way to compass them: for they could find no pretext, unless it were the empty show of magnificence which belongs to a court, & the example of foreign princes; for the former kings had always trusted themselves to the faith of the barons. At length on a false & ridiculous pretence, of an purpose in a definite nobleman to seize her person, they assumed them; but they were soon abolished. Nor had her son King James any other guards whilst they was King of Scotland only, than forty gentlemen: & that King declares in the act of parliament, by which they are established, that they won't burden his people by any tax or imposition for their maintenance.
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